S
afety engineering has a good, though not unblemished, record of providing high technology that is safe and effective. However, the increasing prevalence of risk from cyber threats and the well-documented trend toward more complex and interconnected systems mean that change is needed if that record is to continue or improve. We participate in a program that aims to transform the way safety engineers think, in order to make "security mindedness" a common practiceto consider the impact their work might have on security as well as the impact security may have on their work. Our goal is to make safety engineers more aware of security and to give them the processes, procedures, and knowledge to successfully apply it to their efforts.
Toward that end, we developed two codes of practice (CoPs) for the rail and automotive sectors, sponsored by government with support from industry stakeholders. We built on our previous work on securityinformed safety, which was summarized in a previous Computer article. 1 The two CoPs are intended to complement and standardize current industry initiatives and to create a process for cooperation between security and safety engineers. They are primarily aimed at people with a safety background who need to know how security issues impact their existing safety practice, but in response to comments from our industry stakeholder group we have 
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NIST; j.voas@ieee.org also provided a route through the documents for those with a security background.
SCOPE OF THE CODES OF PRACTICE
Each CoP applies to the entire rail or automotive transportation ecosystem and is intended to help suppliers, operators, and maintainers of systems used in a connected transportation system ensure that security-related risks in their products, services, or activities do not pose unacceptable risks to safety. Security concerns that are not directly safety-related, such as confidentiality, privacy, and theft, as well as financial and reputational risks fall outside the CoPs' scope. The CoPs apply to risks that can affect a single system or a few systems. They also give recommendations for managing systemic risks that might appear small but become significant when interdependencies are considered and the failure of a single or a few entities could result in widespread failure. Another important aspect of the CoPs is the recognition that every organization within the transportation ecosystem should be a "good citizen" with regard to cybersecurity to minimize the safety risks to users of transportation systems and society as a whole.
DEVELOPING THE CODES OF PRACTICE
There is plenty of advice and guidance available on safety and security, but it can sometimes seem rather ad hoc. To justify the structure and contents of the CoPs and to ensure complete coverage of the system lifecycle, we adopted a more systematic approach for each CoP that would › develop a generic set of principles that are applicable to security-informed safety from analysis of existing related principles, consideration of the objectives of security-informed safety, and experience with developing security-informed safety assessments; › adapt these generic principles to the rail and automotive industries by providing appropriate annotations and comments; and › provide a set of supporting appendices that include more detail and guidance about the application of the CoPs.
We undertook initial development of the CoPs using a combination of topdown and bottom up approaches.
Top-down view
To develop and justify the generic principles for each CoP, we constructed a Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) case showing how the principles support a high-level vision for industry.
The top-down approach started from an overall vision for the transportation sector, for example: "We see a world where everyone has confidence in a safe and secure rail transportation sector." From this, we derived a top-level claim: "There is justified confidence that cybersecurity issues do not pose unacceptable risks to the safety and resilience of rail transportation." Then, using the CAE approach to assurance, we developed a network of linked subclaims supported by a set of principles. We used these to derive the CoP recommendations.
The complete CAE structure we developed is shown in Figure 1 , which identifies the main sets of principles. These include claims about › current and future organizational aspects, › assets and competencies, › the development lifecycle, › the assurance case, › future behavior of the product, and › supporting confidence of other stakeholders.
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Bottom-up view
The bottom-up approach started from existing sets of security-and safetyfocused principles and guidance produced for a number of safety-related sectors, including the following: Although none of these documents addressed the exact scope of the project, they were all useful resources. We examined overlaps between these various sets of principles and extracted common themes. We then compared these common themes with the initial set of recommendations derived from our top-down approach to ensure that there was adequate coverage of the important points.
Using this bottom-up approach, we identified a set of categories and mapped the various sets of principles onto these categories. Our analysis identified three broad categories of principles:
› organizational security, › product or project lifecycle, and › design principles (covering architecture through component design).
CODES OF PRACTICE ORGANIZATION AND CONTENTS
Based on our top-down and bottom-up analyses, we identified six broad topics that formed the sections of each CoP, as shown in Table 1 .
Each CoP also contains a number of appendices that provide more detailed guidance on specific topics to help organizations implement the recommendations, as summarized in Table 2 .
In line with modern regulatory approaches, the recommendations in the CoPs are framed as outcome-based measures, accompanied by notes about the characteristics that adequate implementations of these measures would be expected to have. 
EXAMPLE: CONTRIBUTING TO A SAFE AND SECURE WORLD
Here we illustrate the CoPs' general style and content. Each section of the CoP begins with some introductory text that discusses the impact of security considerations on this particular aspect of safety practice. For example, the introduction to Section 6, "Contributing to a safe and secure world" (see Figure 2) , contrasts the open culture of safety toward learning from accidents and near-misses with the need to share information about security vulnerabilities in a responsible and controlled way. It also explains that ensuring the ecosystem's security is a shared responsibility and introduces the concept of "herd immunity." Following the introduction, the recommendations for that section are grouped into a series of topic areas. Each topic has numerous clauses that are expressed as outcome-based measures (what should be done, not how it is to be done), accompanied by explanatory notes and pointers to relevant guidance and standards where appropriate. Figure 3 shows the recommendations for Section 6.
BALANCING SECURITY BY DESIGN AND SECURE OPERATION
Building systems that are both safe and secure requires a defense-in-depth approach. Ideally, systems should be secure by design. Failing that, they should be operated in a secure environment. Moreover, procedures should be in place to deal with the possibility of the secure environment being compromised.
The CoPs make a distinction between building systems that are secure and safe by design and ensuring that systems remain secure and safe during operation. Many legacy systems were designed to operate safely on a closed network but are vulnerable to attack if they are connected to an open network. Such systems were built to be safe but are not necessarily secure because they assume a benign environment. As it might not be possible to patch vulnerabilities in a legacy system, the security risk must be managed. However, new systems should be designed to be secure and safe by default, and to withstand an attack from an adversary that has gained access to a protected network zone. Also, mechanisms should be in place to detect the presence of adversaries in the protected network zone and limit or quarantine their access to the rest of the network.
The CoPs contain advice and guidance on all of these topics, specifically › security-informed development process, › secure and safe design, › maintaining effective defenses, and › incident management.
T
he CoPs are not intended to replace existing safety and security standards and guidance, but rather to provide principles and guidance on how organizations can incorporate security considerations into their safety engineering lifecycle and become more security minded. One of our goals in writing the CoPs was to keep the core guidance to about 20-30 pages, which we have achieved. The CoPs are structured as a set of highlevel recommendations, with notes and references to relevant standards and appendices that provide more detail on specific technical topics.
Our principled approach to creating a generic CoP that can be adapted to particular sectors such as rail and automotive has been successful. Relatively few clauses in the CoP exclusively relate to rail or automotive transportation-most of the advice and guidance is applicable to both sectors.
Section 6:
Contributing to a safe and secure world
In safety industries, lessons learned are typically shared to push best practice forward. The safety of systems is often communicated to end users and society at large via compliance with regulations, certification to standards, or specific testing schemes. Accident and near-miss investigations provide a formalized route for learning from experience, especially in the regulated high-hazard industries.
In contrast, in a security context, information that might help adversaries to optimize their behavior needs to be protected. This includes information on vulnerabilities that are in the process of being patched, details of the organization's threat intelligence, or details of both successful and unsuccessful attacks.
It is worth noting that an organization's assets could be used to compromise the assets of another, and the resilience of the transportation system as a whole can be improved if all assets involved are hardened against attack-so-called herd immunity-and information on security vulnerabilities and failure modes is shared to enable appropriate design decisions to be made.
While the safety-focused organization will be attuned to the need to monitor, respond, and learn from and share experience, security will bring new definitions of what constitutes an event worth reporting, changes to how and to whom this information is reported, and the protocols for reporting and escalating externally. This is particularly relevant in the context of systemic failure, where hazardous situations can be caused in a class of systems due to a shared common vulnerability. We currently have mature drafts of both CoPs that are being reviewed by industry stakeholders before going out for wider distribution; the Publicly Available Specification (PAS) is available from the British Standards Institution (BSI) as PAS 11281. To build consensus around the CoPs, we plan to organize a series of workshops with representative stakeholders to explore the CoPs' application to their situation. We propose that all safety justifications should consider security, and an important next step is to show how following the CoPs can produce a security-informed safety case. ROBERT STROUD is a principal consultant at Adelard LLP, where he provides technical leadership on a broad range of projects, particularly relating to security-informed safety in the railway sector. He is a Chartered Engineer and a member of the IET.
Contact him at rjs@adelard.com.
